A new report on Benghazi does little to resolve the ongoing controversy about what happened.

The U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued its investigative report last week on the terrorist attacks on the U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya. Those attacks, which occurred on Sept. 11-12, 2012, resulted in the deaths of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty, and happened two months before the presidential election of 2012.

Supporters of the administration read the report as a vindication of the administration’s handling of the tragic events of September 2012. Those who believe that the administration manipulated the story and facts at the time in order to align with the president’s campaign rhetoric that General Motors is alive and Osama bin Laden is dead (that is to say, al-Qaeda is on the ropes) think that this report is, to quote Sen. Lindsay Graham, R-S.C., “full of crap.”

Both arguments are, by their nature, political in nature, and–if you read the entire unclassified report–oversimplifications of what is actually contained within the report.

First, this report is narrow in scope–not the broad all-encompassing review that Republican Rep. Trey Gowdy’s select committee has been tasked with performing. Rather, the HPSI’s report, as it states, is a “statement on the Intelligence Community’s activities before, during and after the tragic events that caused the deaths of four brave Americans.” The focus of this report is on the intelligence community’s activities only–a difficult task given the awkward and at times strained relationship between the IC and the House and Senate.

Left for another day–most likely Gowdy’s select committee–is the role of the State Department, Department of Defense and all pieces of the pie to include political motivations. The HPSI report states upfront that the “report does not assess State Department or Defense Department activities other than where those activities impact, or were impacted by, the work of the intelligence community.”

Despite its narrow focus, the HPSI report does add to the record, including a detailed minute-by-minute account of the attacks. The two-year investigation appears to be thorough, and included detailed interviews with senior intelligence officials and eyewitnesses to the attack, review of “thousands of intelligence assessments, cables, notes and emails” and more. Notably, the Committee reviewed video footage from the State Department’s Temporary Mission Facility and the CIA’s Annex in Benghazi, and from two unarmed Predator drones.

Here are the 17 major findings from the report, along with what they actually mean.

  1. There was no evidence of an intelligence failure. Prior to the attacks, the CIA had given ample warning to the State Department of the deteriorating security environment. Furthermore, the CIA did not have specific information about the impending attacks before they happened.
  2. CIA provided sufficient security personnel, resources and equipment to defend against the known terrorist threat.
  3. State Department security personnel, resources, and equipment were unable to counter the terrorist attack that day, and they required CIA assistance. CIA security personnel testified that State Department security officers felt “ill-equipped and ill-trained” to deal with the dangers in Benghazi and their requests for “additional resources” were “pending with the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli.”
  4. The CIA was not collecting and shipping arms from Libya to Syria. The report does state that the CIA was “collecting intelligence about foreign entities that were themselves collecting weapons in Libya and facilitating their passage to Syria.”
  5. Members of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups participated in the attacks. The intelligence community identified 85 individuals who participated in the attacks, including  Abu Khattalah, a leader in Ansar al-Sharia. Khattala was eventually detained in 2014 and flown to the United States to face justice in a federal district court. Additionally, Sufyan bin Qumu, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee, “played some role in the attacks.” The Federalist’s Mollie Hemingway noted in her article “20 Ways Media Completely Misread Congress’ Weak-Sauce Benghazi Report” that the New York Times, up until last Friday, maintained that al-Qaeda had nothing to do with the Benghazi attacks.
  6. Personnel on the ground in Benghazi made the decision to send CIA officers to rescue the State Department officers at the Temporary Mission Facility.
  7. No officer at CIA was ever told to stand down. There were “mere tactical disagreements about the speed with which the [CIA security] team should depart prior to securing additional security assets.”
  8. The CIA security team in Tripoli responded immediately and departed for Benghazi within 45 minutes of receiving the first phone call about the attacks.
  9. Tripoli team decision not to go to hospital to retrieve Ambassador Stevens based on best intelligence at the time.
  10. The CIA received all military support that was available. The report incorporates by reference the House Armed Services Committee report that found that senior-level officials at the Defense Department made “decisions in a timely manner and did not delay in ordering forces to respond.” Why those forces were not available given the deteriorating security situation is not explained.
  11. Then-U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice’s Sept. 16 public statements about the existence of a protest as well as some of the underlying intelligence reports proved to be inaccurate. The report points out that between the time of the attacks and four days later when Rice appeared on the Sunday talk shows, “intelligence analysts and policymakers received a stream of piecemeal intelligence regarding the identities/affiliations and motivations of the attackers, as well as the level of planning and/or coordination.” Witnesses and senior military officials testified that they “knew from the moment the attacks began that the attacks were deliberate terrorist attacks against U.S. interests.” Why the administration sent Rice on to five Sunday talk shows with the talking points she had is a question beyond the scope of this report, and is, no doubt, a political question.
  12. Deputy CIA Director Michael Morell made significant changes to the talking points.
  13. CIA’s Office of Public Affairs also made substantive changes to the talking points by removing the reference to “ties to al Qaeda” in the second bullet of the original draft.
  14. The CIA could have placed more weight on eyewitness sources on the ground and should have challenged its initial assessments about the existence of a protest earlier. On Sept.12–the day the attacks ended–the CIA issued an executive update on the attack stating, “the presence of armed assailants from the incident’s outset suggests this was an intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest.” Since this assessment “lacked source information or any formal intelligence reporting” to support it, it was not “included in any subsequent products.” However, “it proved to be accurate.”
  15. CIA did not intimidate or prevent any officer from speaking to Congress or otherwise telling his story.
  16. There is no evidence that the CIA conducted any unusual polygraph exams related to Benghazi.
  17. The CIA, National Counter Terrorism Center, FBI and other Executive Branch agencies were slow to respond, but they ultimately fully cooperated with the Committee’s investigation.

 HPSI Chairman Mike Rogers–along with three other Republicans–provided additional views in Appendix 1. There, they concluded that:

  1. State Department officials “dismissed repeated threat warnings and denied requests to additional security in eastern Libya, thereby placing U.S. personnel at unnecessary risk.”
  2. That the U.S. military’s response to the attack was “severely degraded because of the location and readiness posture of U.S. forces, and because of a lack of clarity about how the terrorist action was unfolding.”
  3. Senior U.S. officials perpetuated an inaccurate story that matched the administration’s misguided view that the United States was nearing a victory over al Qaeda

Rogers is highly critical of the administration and in particular, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the State Department. He writes that the “administration’s flawed perception that al Qaeda was on the decline contributed to inadequate Diplomatic Security protection in Benghazi.” Clinton “received numerous reports of attacks in and around Benghazi…[yet] did not approve repeated requests for additional security.”

Furthermore, he is equally critical of Rice’s inaccurate public statements and trusts that “the truth about what Rice knew in the days before and after the attacks will come to light in the course of other ongoing investigations.”

The blame “rests with those who refused to recognize risk and think strategically. The blame rests with those officials who failed to ensure America’s front-line professionals had the tools, resources, authorities and assets to succeed in the fight we are in.”